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FROM	  THE	  COURTHOUSE	  TO	  THE	  CHALKBOARD	  
Thomas	  F.	  Burke	  *	  
MICHAEL	   J.	  KLARMAN,	  FROM	  THE	  CLOSET	  TO	  THE	  ALTAR:	  COURTS,	  BACKLASH,	  AND	  THE	  STRUGGLE	  FOR	  SAME-­‐SEX	  MARRIAGE	  (2012).	  Pp.	  288.	  Hardcover	  $22.91.	  	  I	  have	  taught	  Gerald	  Rosenberg’s	  The	  Hollow	  Hope1	  many	  times,	  but	  one	  occa-­‐sion	   I	   will	   never	   forget.	   A	   student,	   asked	   to	   give	   a	   presentation	   on	   Rosenberg’s	  chapter	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education,	  began	  by	  drawing	  on	  a	  chalk-­‐board	  from	  memory	  a	  timeline	  of	  some	  of	  the	  developments	  in	  American	  race	  rela-­‐tions	  in	  the	  years	  following	  Brown.2	  He	  wrote	  in	  small	   letters,	  and	  filled	  the	  entire	  chalkboard.	   There	   were	   the	   major	   protests	   and	   marches,	   the	   rise	   of	   civil	   rights	  leaders	   and	   organizations,	   shifts	   in	   the	   economy,	   demographic	   changes,	   develop-­‐ments	   in	   popular	   culture,	   international	   influences,	   significant	   legislation—and	   of	  course	  the	  major	  court	  cases,	  represented	  by	  a	  few	  marks	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  chalk.	  I	  might	  have	  congratulated	  myself	  as	  a	  teacher	  for	  stimulating	  the	  student	  to	  problematize	  the	  relationship	  of	   law	  and	  society	   in	  such	  a	  humble	  yet	  telling	  way,	  but	   this	  was	   no	   ordinary	   class,	   and	   he	  was	   no	   ordinary	   student.	   The	   class	  was	   a	  group	  of	  judges	  studying	  for	  graduate	  degrees	  in	  Justice	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Nevada,	   people	   perhaps	   particularly	   attuned	   to	   the	   limits	   of	   judicial	   power.	   The	  student	  was	   the	  Honorable	  Calvin	  Hawkins,	  a	   trial	   judge	   in	   the	   Indiana	  court	   sys-­‐tem.	   Judge	  Hawkins	   had	   served	   in	   the	   Civil	   Rights	  Division	   of	   the	   Justice	  Depart-­‐ment	  and	  so	  had	  a	  particularly	  useful	  perspective	  on	  the	  role	  of	  litigation	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  struggle.	  He	  used	  the	  chalkboard	  to	  make	  an	  essential	  point:	  law	  is	  just	  one	  in	  a	   sea	   of	   interrelated	   social	   forces,	   and	   trying	   to	   draw	   a	   line	   between	   a	   particular	  case	  and	  a	  social	  outcome	  is	  extraordinarily	  difficult.	  Reading	  From	  the	  Closet	  to	  the	  Altar,3	  Michael	  Klarman’s	  judicious	  account	  of	  the	   role	   of	   law	   in	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   campaign	   for	   same-­‐sex	  marriage,	   I	  was	   re-­‐minded	  of	  that	  big	  chalkboard.	  Klarman	  uses	  the	  story	  of	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  movement	  to	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  law	  and	  courts	  in	  politics.	  I	  love	  nar-­‐ratives,	  and	  I	  think	  Klarman’s	  will	  be	  well	  received,	  like	  his	  earlier	  book	  on	  Brown	  v.	  
Board	  of	  Education,4	  but	   in	  part	  because	  his	  book	  is	  so	  well	  executed,	   it	   illustrates	  
                                                            	   *	   Professor	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Wellesley	  College.	  Thanks	   to	   Jeb	  Barnes	  and	  Ken	  Kersch	   for	   their	  advice	  on	  a	  previous	  draft,	  and	  to	  my	  students	  at	  the	  Judicial	  Studies	  Program	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Neva-­‐da,	  especially	  the	  Honorable	  Judge	  Calvin	  Hawkins,	  for	  teaching	  me	  their	  perspectives	  on	  judicial	  power.	  	  	   1.	  	   GERALD	  ROSENBERG,	  THE	  HOLLOW	  HOPE:	  CAN	  COURTS	  BRING	  ABOUT	  SOCIAL	  CHANGE?	  (2d	  ed.	  2008).	  
	   2.	  	   Brown	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.,	  349	  U.S.	  294	  (1955).	  	   3.	  	   MICHAEL	  J.	  KLARMAN,	  FROM	  THE	  CLOSET	  TO	  THE	  ALTAR:	  COURTS,	  BACKLASH,	  AND	  THE	  STRUGGLE	  FOR	  SAME-­‐SEX	  MARRIAGE	  (2012).	  	   4.	  	   MICHAEL	   J.	   KLARMAN,	   FROM	   JIM	   CROW	   TO	   CIVIL	   RIGHTS:	   THE	   SUPREME	   COURT	   AND	   THE	   STRUGGLE	   FOR	  
1
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the	  limits	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  narrative	  for	  helping	  us	  to	  understand	  judicial	  power.	  Klarman’s	  claim	  is	  that	  state	  court	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  decisions,	  while	  “prob-­‐ably”	  advancing	  the	  cause	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  marriage,	  have	  also	  caused	  backlashes	  that	  have	  had	  deleterious	  effects	   for	   the	  gay	  and	   lesbian	  rights	  movement	  and	   for	  the	  Democratic	  Party.5	  This	   is	  different	  from	  Rosenberg’s	  claims	  about	  constraints	  on	   judicial	   power	   in	  The	   Hollow	   Hope,	   but	   it	   is	   framed	   in	   the	   same	  way:	   we	   are	  asked	  to	  imagine	  a	  counterfactual,	  a	  different	  world	  in	  which	  courts	  did	  not	  act,	  and	  think	  about	  how	  that	  world	  compares	  to	  the	  one	  we	  live	  in.	  Klarman’s	  claim	  is	  that	  without	   state	   cases	   like	   Baehr	   v.	   Lewin	   and	   Goodridge	   v.	   Department	   of	   Public	  
Health,	   the	   gay	  and	   lesbian	   rights	  movement	  would	  be	   in	  better	   shape,	   and	   sepa-­‐rately,	   that	   John	  Kerry	  might	  have	  been	  president	   in	  2004.6	   (Whether	   that	  would	  have	  benefitted	   the	  Democratic	  Party	   in	   the	   long	  run	   is	  anyone’s	  guess.)	  To	   try	   to	  convince	   us	   of	   this,	   Klarman	   provides	   a	   compact	   history	   of	   the	   gay	   and	   lesbian	  rights	  movement	  in	  which	  he	  pays	  particular	  attention	  to	  backlashes.	  Along	  the	  way	  he	  attempts	  to	  measure	  the	  collateral	  damage	  wrought	  by	  backlashes,	  particularly	  those	  generated	  by	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  litigation.	  One	  virtue	  of	  Klarman’s	  book	  is	  that	  while	  law	  is	  in	  the	  foreground,	  the	  whole	  chalkboard	   is	  evoked.	  Klarman	  begins	  his	  narrative	   in	   the	  1950s,	  not	   so	   long	  ago,	  when	  even	  progressive	  groups	  considered	  homosexuality	  a	  sickness	  or	  a	  sin	  rather	  than	  a	  political	  cause.	  The	  position	  of	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  was	  such	  that	  when	  the	  first	  significant	  gay	  rights	  group,	  the	  Mattachine	  Society,	  formed	  in	  1951,	  it	  did	  so	  in	  se-­‐cret,	  with	  members	   using	   a	   cell	   structure	   and	   aliases	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   being	   un-­‐masked.7	  The	  stance	  of	  the	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union	  (“ACLU”)	  at	  the	  time	  was	  that	  homosexuals	  were	  “socially	  heretical	  or	  deviant”	  so	  punishing	  homosexual	  acts	  raised	  no	   civil	   liberties	   issues.8	   In	   the	  1960s,	   the	   attack	  on	   the	   “homophobic	   con-­‐sensus”	  commenced,	  mostly	  in	  the	  big	  cities	  and,	  quietly,	  among	  legal	  and	  therapeu-­‐tic	  professionals.	  The	  ACLU,	  having	  championed	  sexual	  privacy	   in	  Griswold	  v.	  Con-­‐
necticut,9	  reversed	  its	  stance	  on	  homosexuality	  and	  began	  fighting	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  gays	  and	  lesbians.10	  The	  famous	  Stonewall	  Riot	  of	  1969,	  in	  which	  gays	  fought	  back	  against	  a	  police	  raid	  on	  a	  gay	  bar	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  stimulated	  a	  new	  era	  of	  gay	  liberation.	  Gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  groups	  proliferated,	  and	  in	  the	  1970s,	  politicians	  and	  cultural	  figures	  began	  voicing	  their	  support	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  homosexuals.11	  In	  1973,	  the	  American	  Psychological	  Association	  and	  American	  Medical	  Association	  de-­‐listed	  homosexuali-­‐ty	  as	  a	  mental	   illness,	  and	  by	  1977	  nearly	  half	   the	  states,	   influenced	  by	  the	  Model	  Penal	  Code,	  had	  quietly	  repealed	  their	  sodomy	  statutes.12	  All	  of	   this	   sets	   the	   stage	   for	   the	   first	  backlash	   in	   the	  book,	  which	  erupted	   in	  
                                                                                                                                                    RACIAL	  EQUALITY	  (2004);	  	   5.	  	   Id.	  at	  218.	  	   6.	  	   Id.	  at	  112,	  212.	  See	  also	  Goodridge	  v.	  Dep’t	  of	  Pub.	  Health,	  798	  N.E.2d	  941	  (Mass.	  2003);	  Baehr	  v.	  Lewin,	  852	  P.2d	  44	  (Haw.	  1993).	  	   7.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  6.	  	   8.	  	   Id.	  	   9.	  	   Griswold	  v.	  Connecticut,	  381	  U.S.	  479	  (1965).	  	   10.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  6.	  	   11.	  	   Id.	  at	  22-­‐23.	  	   12.	  	   Id.	  at	  23.	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1977,	   after	   Dade	   County	   Florida	   enacted	   an	   ordinance	   banning	   discrimination	  against	   homosexuals.13	   The	   campaign	   to	   overturn	   this	   ordinance	   turned	   a	   former	  Miss	   America	   runner-­‐up,	   singer	   Anita	   Bryant,	   into	   a	   star.	   Bryant’s	   organization,	  Save	   Our	   Children,	   collected	   $200,000	   as	   part	   of	   a	   drive	   to	   repeal	   the	   ordinance	  through	  a	  county	  referendum.14	  Gay	  rights	  groups	  around	  the	  country	  fought	  back,	  raising	  $300,000	  for	  their	  campaign,	  and	  a	  county	  referendum	  election	  became	  the	  first	  prominent	  battlefield	  in	  the	  cultural	  struggle	  over	  gay	  rights.15	  It	  proved	  a	  ma-­‐jor	  defeat	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights,	  with	  68	  percent	  of	  Dadeans	  voting	  to	  overturn	  the	   ordinance.16	   Across	   the	  United	   States,	   several	   other	  municipalities	   also	   rolled	  back	  their	  ordinances	  in	  the	  1970s.17	  Despite	  some	  signs	  of	  progress,	  the	  gay	  rights	  movement	  was	  just	  getting	  started.	  In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  Klarman	  notes,	  72	  percent	  of	  Americans	  still	  considered	  homosexuality	  “always	  wrong.”18	  And	  then	  things	  seemed	  to	  get	  worse.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  Moral	  Majority	  and	  the	  Christian	  Right	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  plague	  of	  AIDS.	  On	  the	  legal	  front	  came	  Bowers	  
v.	  Hardwick,	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  by	  a	  five	  to	  four	  decision,	  concluded	  that	  criminalizing	  homosexual	   (and	  heterosexual)	   acts	  was	  within	   the	  American	   tradi-­‐tion	   and	   so	   no	   violation	   of	   the	   Fourteenth	   Amendment.19	   But	   all	   these	   develop-­‐ments	  stimulated	  mobilization.	   In	   the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  a	  bevy	  of	  gay	  and	   lesbian	  groups	  grew	  up,	   from	  the	  AIDS	  Coalition	   to	  Unleash	  Power	  (“ACT	  UP”)	   to	   the	  Log	  Cabin	  Republicans,	  and	  more	  and	  more	  openly	  gay	  politicians	  were	  elected.20	  Gay	  and	   lesbian	   rights	   groups	   became	  more	   closely	   allied	   with	   the	   Democratic	   Party	  against	  the	  surging	  cultural	  conservatism	  of	  Republicans;	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  evidence	  suggested	  that	  the	  Democrats	  benefitted	  from	  this	  line-­‐up.	  A	  New	  York	  Times	  arti-­‐cle	  summarized	  the	  situation	  in	  1992	  as	  “Gay	  Politics	  Goes	  Mainstream.”21	  Perhaps	  the	  biggest	  engine	  of	  social	  change,	  as	  gay	  rights	  icon	  Harvey	  Milk	  had	  prophesied,	  was	   the	  movement	   of	   gays	   and	   lesbians	   out	   of	   the	   closet.	   By	  1992,	   43	  percent	   of	  Americans	   reported	   knowing	   a	   homosexual—twice	   the	   percentage	   of	   just	   seven	  years	  before.22	  As	  has	   since	  become	  clear,	   the	  emptying	  out	  of	   the	   closet,	   and	   the	  resulting	  public	  visibility	  of	  gays	  and	   lesbians,	   changed	   the	  way	  young	  people	  are	  socialized	  about	  sexual	  orientation,	  so	  that	  since	  the	  1970s,	  each	  generation	  has	  be-­‐come	  less	  and	  less	  homophobic,	  transforming	  the	  politics	  of	  gay	  rights.	  The	  momen-­‐tum	  of	  this	  underlying	  social	  transformation	  seems	  largely	  unaffected	  by	  the	  politi-­‐cal-­‐legal	   events	   that	   Klarman	   details,	   undermining	   the	   emphasis	   he	   puts	   on	  moments	  of	  political	  backlash.	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  first	  year	  in	  office,	  1993,	  was	  a	  big	  year	  for	  backlashes.	  Clinton’s	  
                                                            	   13.	  	   Id.	  at	  26.	  	   14.	  	   Id.	  at	  27.	  	   15.	  	   Id.	  	   16.	  	   Id.	  at	  27-­‐28.	  	   17.	  	   Id.	  at	  29.	  	   18.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	   19.	  	   Bowers	  v.	  Hardwick,	  478	  U.S.	  186,	  191-­‐95	  (1986);	  KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  37.	  	   20.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  40,	  44.	  	   21.	  	   Jeffrey	   Schmalz,	   Gay	   Politics	   Goes	   Mainstream,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   Oct.	   11,	   1992,	  http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/11/magazine/gay-­‐politics-­‐goes-­‐mainstream.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.	  	   22.	  	   Id.	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proposal	  to	  remove	  restrictions	  on	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  in	  the	  military	  created	  a	  furor,	  leading	  his	  administration	  to	  the	  deeply	  problematic	  “don’t	  ask	  don’t	  tell”	  policy.23	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Hawaii	  generated	  another	  backlash	  when	  it	  ruled	  in	  Baehr	  v.	  
Lewin	  that	  a	  state	  law	  restricting	  marriage	  to	  opposite	  sex	  couples	  was	  a	  sex-­‐based	  classification,	  and	  thus	  had	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  compelling	  interest.24	  While	  the	  Hawaii	  judicial	  system	  wrestled	  over	  the	  resulting	  legal	   issues,	  a	  political	  battle	  ensued.	  A	  referendum	   giving	   the	   state	   legislature	   the	   constitutional	   power	   to	   ban	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  passed	  overwhelmingly	  in	  1998,	  69	  percent	  to	  31	  percent.25	  	  
Baehr	  brought	  the	  marriage	  issue	  to	  national	  attention,	  and	  gave	  cultural	  con-­‐servatives	  an	  issue	  on	  which	  the	  public	  clearly	  sided	  with	  them—nationally,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  opponents	  outnumbered	  supporters	  roughly	  two	  to	  one.	  In	  1994,	  Re-­‐publicans	   gained	   majorities	   in	   both	   the	   House	   and	   Senate,	   and	   so	   were	   able	   to	  shepherd	   through	  Congress	   the	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	   (“DOMA”),	  which	  defined	  marriage	  for	  federal	  purposes	  as	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman,	  cutting	  off	  same-­‐sex	  couples	   from	   federal	   benefits,	   even	   if	   under	   state	   law	   they	  were	  married.26	  With	  public	  opinion	  so	  lopsided,	  even	  Democrats	  mostly	  voted	  for	  the	  measure.	  It	  passed	  by	   overwhelming	  margins	   in	   the	   Senate	   and	  House,	   and	  was	   signed	   by	   President	  Clinton	  in	  1996.27	  At	  the	  state	  level,	  meanwhile,	  by	  2001,	  thirty-­‐five	  states	  had	  en-­‐acted	  their	  own	  defense	  of	  marriage	  laws,	  usually	  by	  overwhelming	  margins.28	  
Baehr	   is	   the	   first	   of	   the	   several	   judicial	   backlashes	   that	   Klarman	   analyzes.	  There	  followed	  Baker	  v.	  Vermont,	  Goodridge	  v.	  Public	  Health	  Department,	  In	  re	  Mar-­‐
riage	  Cases,	  and	  Varnum	  v.	  Brien.29	  In	  Klarman’s	  account,	  the	  particularities	  of	  each	  ruling	  don’t	  seem	  to	  have	  much	  influence	  on	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  backlash	  that	  results.	  
Baker,	   for	  example,	  was	  arguably	  a	  modest	  decision.	  The	  Vermont	  Supreme	  Court	  held	   that	   denying	   same	   sex	   couples	   the	   state	   benefits	   of	   marriage	   violated	   the	  “common	  benefits”	  provision	  of	  the	  state	  constitution,	  and	  invited	  the	  legislature	  to	  fix	   the	   problem	   in	  whatever	  way	   it	  wished,	   including	   through	   some	   kind	   of	   non-­‐marriage	   arrangement.30	   Yet	   Baker	   turned	   peaceful	   little	   Vermont	   upside	   down,	  making	  marriage	   the	  dominant	  political	   issue	   in	   the	   state,	   and	   leading	   the	  Demo-­‐crats	   to	   lose	   their	  majority	   in	   the	  state’s	   lower	  house	   in	   the	   following	  year’s	  elec-­‐tion.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Baker,	  the	  Massachusetts	  judges	  in	  Goodridge	  were	  not	  inclined	  to	  start	  a	  “dialogue”	  with	  the	  legislature—they	  specifically	  ruled	  that	  any	  law	  short	  of	  full	  marriage	  equality	  would	  be	  unconstitutional.31	  That	  ruling	  was	  initially	  quite	  unpopular,	  and	  it	  required	  some	  elaborate	  legislative	  maneuvering	  to	  hold	  off	  a	  ref-­‐erendum	  reversal.	  Yet,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  did	  not	  become	  a	  dominant	  issue	  in	  Mas-­‐
                                                            	   23.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  43.	  	   24.	  	   Baehr	  v.	  Lewin,	  852	  P.2d	  44,	  67	  (1993);	  KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  56.	  	   25.	  	   Hawaii	   Gives	   Legislature	   Power	   to	   Ban	   Same-­‐Sex	   Marriage,	   CNN.COM,	   Nov.	   3,	   1998,	  http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/11/04/same.sex.ballot/.	  	   26.	  	   H.R.	  3396,	  S.	  1740,	  104th	  Cong.	  (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996));	  KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  61-­‐62.	  	   27.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  63.	  	   28.	  	   Id.	  at	  59.	  	   29.	  	   Baker	  v.	  Vermont,	  744	  A.2d	  864	  (1999);	  Goodridge	  v.	  Dep’t	  of	  Pub.	  Health,	  798	  N.E.2d	  941	  (2003);	  
In	  re	  Marriage	  Cases,	  43	  Cal.4th	  757	  (2008);	  Varnum	  v.	  Brien,	  763	  N.W.2d	  862	  (2009).	  	   30.	  	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  77.	  	   31.	  	   Goodridge,	  798	  N.E.2d	  at	  965-­‐66,	  Opinion	  of	  the	  Justices	  to	  the	  Senate,	  SJC-­‐09163	  (Feb.	  3,	  2004).	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sachusetts	  politics.	   In	  the	  elections	  that	  followed,	  Klarman	  suggests	  that	  only	  anti-­‐marriage	  politicians	  appeared	  to	  suffer	  at	  the	  polls.32	  Nationally,	   however,	   the	   backlash	   to	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   that	   followed	  
Goodridge	  was	  ferocious.	  In	  the	  ensuing	  2004	  election,	  thirteen	  states	  enacted	  con-­‐stitutional	  provisions	  defining	  marriage	  as	  between	  a	  woman	  and	  a	  man.33	  In	  nine	  of	  these	  states,	  the	  constitutional	  amendment	  also	  barred	  civil	  unions,	  in	  a	  few	  cas-­‐es	  effectively	  repealing	  benefits	  that	  had	  already	  being	  given	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples.34	  Thirty-­‐nine	   states	  had	  already	  enacted	  defense	  of	  marriage	   laws	  by	   this	   time,	  but	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutionalizing	  such	  laws	  was	  to	  make	  them	  much	  harder	  to	  over-­‐turn.35	  Klarman	  also	  raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  Goodridge,	  by	  mobilizing	  cultural	  con-­‐servatives,	  swung	  the	  2004	  presidential	  election.36	  Republicans	  clearly	  did	  see	  the	  political	  uses	  of	   the	   issue,	  at	   least	   for	  mobilizing	  evangelical	  Christians:	  George	  W.	  Bush	  endorsed	  a	   constitutional	   amendment	   to	  define	  marriage	  as	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman,	  and	  targeted	  messages	  about	  this	  stance	  to	  conservative	  Christians.37	  But	  Bush	  had	  to	  walk	  a	  fine	  line,	  as	  he	  had	  to	  worry	  about	  alienating	  more	  moderate	  and	  secular	  voters	  by	  seeming	  anti-­‐gay,	   so	   the	  constitutional	  amendment	  was	  not	  one	   of	   his	   major	   themes	   in	   the	   campaign.38	   Klarman’s	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   Ohio,	  where	  Bush	  prevailed	  by	  a	  mere	  119,000	  votes,	  and	  where	  a	  defense	  of	  marriage	  ballot	  measure	  passed	  62	  percent	  to	  38	  percent.39	  Analyzing	  Ohio	  in	  isolation	  from	  voting	   trends	   in	  other	   states	   can	  be	  misleading,	  however:	   assessing	   the	   impact	  of	  the	  marriage	  issue	  requires	  a	  sophisticated	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  voting	  patterns	  across	  the	  whole	  nation—an	  effort	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  book.	  Klarman	  cites	  a	  bunch	  of	  such	  studies	  that	  come	  to	  differing	  conclusions	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  issue.	  I	  think	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  evidence,	  and	  the	  stronger	  stud-­‐ies,	  cast	  doubt	  on	  marriage	  as	  a	  pivotal	  issue	  in	  the	  election,	  but	  Klarman	  does	  not	  overclaim	  on	   this	   point.	  He	  merely	   concludes	   that	   “no	   one	   can	  possibly	   know	   for	  sure.”40	  Most	   of	   the	   backlashes	   Klarman	   recounts	  were	   the	   result	   of	   judicial	   rulings	  like	  Goodridge,	  but	  as	  Klarman	  demonstrates,	  backlashes	  can	  be	  created	  by	  legisla-­‐tion,	  as	   in	  the	  Dade	  County	  ordinance	  that	  attracted	  Anita	  Bryant’s	   ire,	  or	  even	  by	  executive	  action,	  as	  when	  San	  Francisco	  Mayor	  Gavin	  Newsom	  in	  1994	  authorized	  city	   clerks	   to	   grant	   marriage	   licenses—an	   act	   that	   Klarman	   says	   “more	   than	   the	  
Goodridge	   decision	  .	  .	  .	  ignited	   the	   powerful	   political	   backlash	   of	   2004.”41	   An	   im-­‐
                                                            	   32.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  94-­‐95.	  	   33.	  	   Id.	  at	  106.	  	   34.	  	   Id.	  at	  108.	  	  	   35.	  	   Id.	  at	  106.	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  at	  111.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  114.	  	   38.	  	   David	  E.	  Campbell	  &	   J.	  Quin	  Monson,	  The	  Religion	  Card:	  Gay	  Marriage	  and	   the	  2004	  Presidential	  
Election,	  72	  PUB.	  OP.	  Q.	  399	  (2008)	  (noting	  that	  former	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	  stance	  did	  in	  fact	  de-­‐mobilize	  some	  of	  his	  more	  secular	  supporters	  in	  states	  with	  ballot	  measures	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  thus	  partly	  counterbalancing	  the	  mobilizing	  effect	  on	  evangelicals	  in	  those	  states).	  	  	   39.	  	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  112.	  	   40.	  	   Id.	  at	  113.	  	   41.	  	   Id.	  at	  192.	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portant	   lesson	  of	   the	  book	   is	   that	  a	   federalist	   system	  creates	  difficulties	   for	  social	  change	  movements	  because	  advances	  in	  one	  state	  can	  have	  pernicious	  consequenc-­‐es	  in	  the	  others.	  So	  why	  does	  Klarman’s	  book	   focus	  primarily	  on	   the	   judiciary	   as	   a	   source	  of	  backlash?	   Klarman’s	   argument	   is	   that	   courts	   are	   unusually	   prone	   to	   stimulating	  backlash:	  	   Political	   backlash	   results	   from	   government	   action	   that	   strongly	  contravenes	  public	  opinion.	  Whether	  that	  action	  derives	  from	  legis-­‐latures	  or	  courts	  seems	  relatively	  unimportant.	  Yet	  courts	  are	  more	  likely	   than	   legislatures	   to	   take	   action	   that	   is	   sufficiently	   deviant	  from	  public	  opinion	  to	  generate	  powerful	  backlash.42	  	  Judges	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  contravene	  public	  opinion,	  Klarman	  argues,	  because	  they	  are	  socioeconomic	  elites,	  and	  especially	  on	   issues	  such	  as	  civil	   liberties,	   they	  are	  more	  liberal	  than	  the	  average	  citizen.43	  And	  while	  many	  state	  judges	  are	  elected,	  they	  are	  less	  frequently	  involved	  in	  competitive	  elections,	  so	  they	  may	  be	  less	  ori-­‐ented	  to	  public	  opinion	  than	   legislators.	  This	  seems	  a	  highly	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  why	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  advanced	  more	  quickly	  in	  state	  courts	  than	  in	  state	  leg-­‐islatures,	   and	   in	   the	   federal	   courts	   than	   in	  Congress.	   It	   particularly	   explains	  what	  would	  otherwise	   seem	  anomalous,	   that	  most	   of	   the	   important	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  decisions	   have	   been	   issued	   or	   supported	   by	   Republican	   judges.44	   These	   judges	  clearly	  have	  exhibited	  a	  different	  brand	  of	  Republicanism	   from	  that	   seen	   in	  many	  state	  legislatures	  and	  in	  Congress.	  The	  judges,	  Klarman	  contends,	  pushed	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  in	  a	  direction	  that	  was	  not	  politically	  prudent.45	  Klarman	  shows	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  court	  rulings,	   gay	   rights	   activists	  were	   not	   focused	   on	  marriage	   as	   a	   political	   goal,	   and	  contends	  they	  would	  not	  have	  pursued	  it	  so	  vigorously	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  court	  rulings.46	   That	   would	   have	   been	   the	  wiser	   path,	   according	   to	   Klarman:	   Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  a	  fight	  that	  should	  have	  been	  postponed	  until	  after	  lesser	  battles	  had	  been	  won.	  An	  incremental	  approach,	  starting	  with	  more	  innocuous	  issues,	  such	  as	  hate	  crimes	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  in	  employment,	  would	  have	  been	  more	  popular	  and	   provoked	   less	   counter-­‐mobilization.47	   Same-­‐sex	   marriage	   was	   an	   issue	   de-­‐signed	  to	  provoke,	  just	  as	  school	  desegregation	  provoked	  Southern	  whites,	  stymie-­‐ing	  progress	  in	  race	  relations	  in	  the	  South	  for	  many	  years.48	  
                                                            	   42.	  	   Id.	  at	  169.	  	   43.	  	   Id.	  at	  170.	  	   44.	  	   Klarman	  lists	  Judge	  Joseph	  Tauro	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  Federal	  Court	  decision	  on	  the	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act,	   Judge	  Vaughn	  Walker	   in	  Perry	  v.	   Schwarzenegger,	  704	  F.	   Supp.	  2d	  921	   (N.D.	  Cal.	  2010),	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	   Judicial	  Court	  Chief	   Justice	  Margaret	  Marshall,	  California	  Supreme	  Court	  Chief	  Justice	  Ronald	  George,	   Iowa	  Supreme	  Court	   Justice	  Mark	  Cady,	  and	  Connecticut	  Supreme	  Court	   Justice	  Richard	  Palmer.	  KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  171.	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  Justice	  Anthony	  Kennedy	  can	  be	  add-­‐ed	  to	  the	   list:	  he	  wrote	  the	  opinion	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  striking	  down	  the	  Defense	  of	  Mar-­‐riage	  Act	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Windsor,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  2675	  (2013).	  	  	   45.	  	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  171-­‐72.	  	   46.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  174-­‐78.	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  177.	  	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  172.	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Klarman	   seems	   on	   solid	   ground	   when	   he	   argues	   that	   the	   gay	   and	   lesbian	  rights	  movement	  would	  have	  faced	  less	  opposition	  if	  it	  had	  concentrated	  on	  nondis-­‐crimination	   laws,	   which	   polling	   suggests	   were	   quite	   popular	   by	   the	   1990s.	   The	  trouble	  comes	   in	  weighing	  the	  costs	  of	   the	  path	  that	  was	  taken	   instead.	  The	  back-­‐lashes	   certainly	   ended	   some	  political	   careers,	   and	   judicial	   careers	   in	   Iowa,	  where	  the	  uprising	  against	  Varnum	  v.	  Brien	  resulted	  in	  three	  supreme	  court	  judges	  losing	  their	   retention	   elections.49	   But	   for	   the	   lesbian	   and	   gay	   rights	   movement,	   the	   ac-­‐counting	  is	  necessarily	  speculative.	  Klarman	  claims	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  same-­‐sex	  mar-­‐riage	   has	   retarded	   other	   goals	   of	   the	   movement,	   such	   as	   a	   national	   anti-­‐discrimination	  law,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  analyze	  what	  happened	  during	  Congress’s	  con-­‐sideration	  of	  the	  Employment	  Nondiscrimination	  Act.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  backlashes	   to	  Goodridge	   and	   the	   other	   cases	   had	  much	   collateral	   effect	   on	   public	  opinion	  about	  other	  goals	  of	  the	  movement	  such	  as	  nondiscrimination	  laws,	  which	  have	   been	   overwhelmingly	   supported	   in	   public	   opinion	   polling	   for	  many	   years.50	  Indeed	   there	   is	  no	  convincing	  evidence	   that	   the	  backlashes	  have	  had	  more	   than	  a	  temporary	  effect	  on	  national	  public	  opinion	  regarding	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  51	  The	  most	   clear-­‐cut	   loss	   from	  backlash	   is	   the	  defense	  of	  marriage	  provisions	  that	  are	  now	  enshrined	  in	  twenty-­‐nine	  state	  constitutions.52	  Although	  state	  consti-­‐tutions	  are	  typically	  far	  more	  malleable	  than	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution,	  amending	  them	  requires	  a	   lot	  more	  political	  effort	   than	  simply	  passing	  a	   statute	  creating	  civil	  un-­‐ions	   or	   same-­‐sex	   marriage.	   This	   raises	   the	   prospect	   that	   even	   as	   public	   opinion	  swings	   decisively	   in	   favor	   of	   same-­‐sex	   marriage,	   some	   states,	   particularly	   in	   the	  South,	   will	   continue	   to	   ban	  marriage	   and	   even	   civil	   unions.	   (Of	   course	   if	   the	   Su-­‐preme	  Court	  were	  to	  rule	  that	  such	  provisions	  were	  unconstitutional,	  it	  would	  elim-­‐inate	  all	  of	  them	  in	  one	  fell	  swoop.)	  
                                                            	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  151.	  	   50.	  	   	  A	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  public	  opinion	  about	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  by	  Patrick	  J.	  Egan,	  Nathaniel	  Persily,	   and	   Kevin	   Wallsten	   shows	   a	   significant	   drop	   in	   support	   for	   legalizing	   homosexual	   relations	  around	  the	  time	  of	  Lawrence	  v.	  Texas,	  539	  U.S.	  558	  (2003),	  and	  Goodridge	  v.	  Dep’t	  of	  Pub.	  Health,	  798	  N.E.2d	  941	  (2003).	  Polling	   from	  Gallup	  on	  support	   for	  nondiscrimination	   in	  employment	  and	  the	  mili-­‐tary,	  however,	  shows	  a	  barely	  perceptible	  dip	  that	  is	  likely	  within	  the	  margin	  of	  error.	  Patrick	  J.	  Egan	  et	  al.,	  Gay	  Rights,	  in	  PUBLIC	  OPINION	  AND	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  CONTROVERSY	  234,	  241	  (Nathaniel	  Persily,	  Jack	  Citrin	  &	  Patrick	  J.	  Egan	  eds.,	  2008).	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  analysis	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  disentan-­‐gle	   the	   backlash	   effects	   of	   Lawrence,	   presumably	   a	   relatively	   modest	   judicial	   step,	   from	   those	   in	  
Goodridge,	  the	  focus	  of	  Klarman’s	  analysis.	  See	  id.	  at	  256.	  	   51.	  	   Egan	   et	   al.	   conclude	   public	   support	   for	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	   began	   to	   fall	   after	   Lawrence	   in	   the	  summer	  of	  2003	  and	  continued	  to	  fall	  through	  Goodridge	  and	  the	  2004	  election,	  but	  then	  rebounded.	  By	  the	  summer	  of	  2005,	  support	  was	  back	  to	  pre-­‐Lawrence	  levels,	  and	  back	  to	  an	  upward	  trajectory.	  See	  id.	  at	  242-­‐44.	  Nate	  Silver,	  combining	  a	  bunch	  of	  polls	  on	  gay	  marriage	  from	  1996-­‐2012,	  produces	  an	  analy-­‐sis	  that	  seems	  to	  show	  growing	  support	  in	  the	  1990s,	  a	  plateau	  in	  early	  2000s,	  but	  then	  a	  significant	  rise	  beginning	  in	  2004.	  Nate	  Silver,	  How	  Opinion	  on	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  is	  Changing,	  and	  What	  it	  Means,	  538	  Report,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	  Mar.	   26,	   2013,	   http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-­‐opinion-­‐on-­‐same-­‐sex-­‐marriage-­‐is-­‐changing-­‐and-­‐what-­‐it-­‐means/?_r=0.	   Gallup’s	   time	   trend	   looks	   a	   bit	   different,	  with	   support	  growing	   through	  2004,	   then	  plateauing	   for	   several	   years	   followed	  by	  a	  big	   jump	  around	  2011.	  Lydia	  Saad,	  In	  U.S.,	  52%	  Back	  Law	  to	  Legalize	  Gay	  Marriage	  in	  50	  States,	  GALLUP	  POLITICS,	   July	  29,	  2013,	   http://www.gallup.com/poll/163730/back-­‐law-­‐legalize-­‐gay-­‐marriage-­‐states.aspx.	   Pew,	   starting	  in	  2001,	   shows	   a	   slight	   downward	   trend	   in	   support	   until	   2005,	  when	   the	   trend	   reverses	   and	   support	  grows.	   Gay	   Marriage:	   Key	   Data	   Points	   from	   Pew	   Research,	   PEW	   RESEARCH	   CENTER,	   June	   11,	   2013,	  http://www.pewresearch.org/key-­‐data-­‐points/gay-­‐marriage-­‐key-­‐data-­‐points-­‐from-­‐pew-­‐research/.	   The	  different	  patterns	  across	  these	  sources	  likely	  arise	  from	  differences	  in	  question-­‐wording,	  sampling,	  and	  random	  error.	  	  	   52.	  	   Marriage	  Center,	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  CAMPAIGN,	  http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/marriage-­‐center	   (last	  visited	  Jan.	  19,	  2014)	  [hereinafter	  Marriage	  Center].	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The	  problem	  here	   is	  with	   the	   counterfactual:	  we	   cannot	   assume	   that,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  Goodridge	  and	  the	  other	  rulings,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  effort	  to	  en-­‐act	  state	  constitutional	  bans	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  In	  fact	  it	  seems	  quite	  likely	  that	  however	  marriage	  arose	  as	  an	  issue,	  the	  adoption	  of	  marriage	  in	  some	  more	  liberal	  states,	   even	   states	   in	  which	   public	   opinion	   had	   swung	   in	   favor	   of	   same-­‐sex	  mar-­‐riage,	  would	  have	  led	  Christian	  Right	  activists	  in	  other	  states	  to	  propose	  defense	  of	  marriage	  amendments.	  It	  is	  possible	  that,	  especially	  if	  the	  marriage	  issue	  arose	  later	  in	  time,	  there	  would	  be	  fewer	  such	  amendments,	  but	  how	  many	  fewer?	  There	  is	  a	  parallel	  difficulty	  in	  weighing	  the	  benefits	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  liti-­‐gation	  for	  the	  movement.	  Klarman	  acknowledges	  in	  his	  conclusion	  some	  of	  the	  pos-­‐sible	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   same-­‐sex	   court	   decisions	  may	  have	   advanced	   the	   lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement,	  but	  I	  wonder	   if	  he	  gives	  them	  enough	  weight.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  some	  radical	  gay	  activists,	  who	  criticized	  the	  pursuit	  of	  marriage	  as	  “hetero-­‐normative,”	  it	  must	  have	  been	  infuriating	  to	  see	  access	  to	  marriage	  and	  the	  military	  emerge	  as	  the	  two	  defining	  goals	  of	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  movement.	  For	   many	   moderates	   and	   conservatives,	   however,	   these	   goals	   are	   reassuring.	   By	  highlighting	   the	   lives	  of	  gays	  and	   lesbians	  who	  wish	   to	  serve	   their	  country	  by	  de-­‐fending	  it,	  and	  who	  want	  to	  live	  together	  on	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  everyone	  else,	  they	  powerfully	   demonstrate	   the	   conventionality	   of	   homosexuals,	   their	   ordinariness.	  The	   faces	   of	   the	   gay	   and	   lesbian	   rights	   movement	   became	   couples,	   usually	   of	  longstanding	  duration,	  who	  for	  years	  had	  been	  denied	  any	  legal	  recognition	  of	  their	  bond.	  It	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  a	  campaign	  for	  hate	  crimes	  or	  anti-­‐discrimination	  leg-­‐islation	  would	  have	  so	  dramatically	  and	  profoundly	  mainstreamed	  homosexuality.	  Klarman	  claims	  that	  by	  focusing	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  a	  goal,	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement	  has	   forgone	  civil	  unions	  even	   in	  states	  where	  authorizing	  them	  would	  be	  popular	  with	  the	  public.53	  He	  gives	  as	  his	  primary	  examples	  New	  York	  and	  Maine,54	  but	  New	  York	  authorized	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  2009	  and	  Maine	  followed	  in	  2012;	  they	  hardly	  seem	  like	  disasters	  for	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  movement.55	  Only	   four	   states	   currently	   occupy	   the	  middle	   ground	   of	   providing	   benefits	   to	   gay	  and	   lesbian	   couples,	   but	   not	   allowing	   them	   to	  marry.56	   It	  would	   be	   interesting	   to	  find	  out	  how	  many	  states	  that	  do	  not	  recognize	  same-­‐sex	  relationships	  nevertheless	  have	  majority	  support	   for	  civil	  unions.	  That	   is	  a	   long	  way,	  however,	   from	  proving	  that,	   in	   a	  Baehr-­‐less,	  Goodridge-­‐less,	  Varnum-­‐less	  world,	   those	   states	  would	   have	  enacted	  civil	  union	  laws.	  As	  Klarman	  acknowledges,	  civil	  unions	  are	  today	  seen	  as	  the	   moderate	   option	   precisely	   because	   of	   the	   campaign	   for	   same-­‐sex	   marriage,	  which	   framed	   unions	   as	   the	   compromise	   choice.57	   No	   surprise	   then	   that	   polling	  demonstrates	  a	  rise	  in	  support	  for	  civil	  unions	  around	  the	  time	  of	  Goodridge.58	  The	  same	  George	  W.	  Bush	  who	  voiced	  support	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  marriage	  amendment	  to	  
                                                            	   53.	  	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  213.	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  	   55.	  	   Drew	  Desilver,	  How	  Many	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriages	  in	  the	  U.S.?	  At	  Least	  71,165,	  Probably	  More,	  PEW	  RES.	  CTR.,	   June	   26,	   2013,	   http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-­‐tank/2013/06/26/how-­‐many-­‐same-­‐sex-­‐marriages-­‐in-­‐the-­‐u-­‐s-­‐at-­‐least-­‐71165-­‐probably-­‐more/.	  	   56.	  	   Marriage	  Center,	  supra	  note	  52.	  	   57.	  	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  179-­‐80.	  	  	   58.	  	   Egan	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  50,	  at	  253-­‐55.	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the	   Constitution	   also	   endorsed	   civil	   unions	   during	   the	   2004	   campaign.59	   Would	  Bush	  and	  so	  many	  other	  politicians	  have	  embraced	  civil	  unions	  so	  quickly	  if	  not	  for	  
Goodridge?	  The	  difficulty	  of	  weighing	  such	  counterfactuals	  seems	  inevitable,	  particularly	  in	  a	  historical	  narrative	  about	  a	  social	  movement	   that	   is	   subject	   to	  so	  many	   influ-­‐ences,	  so	  many	  marks	  on	  the	  chalkboard	  coming	  together.	  Scholars	  have	  produced	  many	  such	  narratives	  devoted	  to	  social	  movements	  that	  had	  a	  litigation	  component,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  studies,	  like	  Klarman’s,	  are	  specifically	  aimed	  at	  raising	  questions	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  institutions	  on	  politics.60	  To	  supplement	  these	  his-­‐torical	  narratives,	  I	  urge	  scholars	  to	  consider	  as	  an	  alternative	  the	  method	  of	  com-­‐parison.	   Did	   nations	   with	   more	   judicial	   activity	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   gay	   and	   lesbian	  rights	  have	  different	  outcomes	  from	  those	  in	  which	  the	  judiciary	  took	  a	  more	  mod-­‐est	   role?	   Klarman	   claims	   that	   “[i]n	   other	   countries,	  where	   courts	   typically	   play	   a	  less	  central	  role	  on	  issues	  of	  social	  reform,	  gay	  rights	  progress	  has	  occurred	  more	  incrementally	   through	   legislatures	   and	  has	   generated	   less	   political	   backlash,”	   and	  cities	  a	  few	  sources	  to	  back	  up	  this	  claim.61	  The	  most	  sweeping	  comparative	  study	  he	   cites,	   however,	  which	   covers	   Europe,	   Canada,	   and	   the	  United	   States,	   primarily	  ascribes	  the	  American	  pattern	  to	  the	  greater	  religiosity	  and	  cultural	  conservatism	  of	  Americans	   as	   compared	   to	   citizens	  of	   other	   affluent	  nations.	   (Backlashes	  must	  be	  stimulated	   by	   some	   institution,	   but	   they	   also	   require	   backlashers,	   and	   the	  United	  States	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  a	  copious	  supply	  ready	  to	  be	  provoked.)	  Indeed	  the	  study	  cites	  as	  one	  cause	  of	  the	  lagging	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  rights	  in	  the	  United	  States	  “the	  absence	   of	   leadership	   in	   the	   area	   of	   sexual	   diversity	   rights	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Supreme	  Court,”	  contrasting	  that	  with	  the	  greater	  support	  provided	  by	  courts	  in	  Canada.62	  It	  may	  be	   that	  nations	   that	  have	   judicialized	   their	  policies	   regarding	   sexual	  orienta-­‐tion	   have	   been	   prone	   to	   greater	   backlash,	   but	   a	  more	   precise	   comparative	   study	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  probe	  this	  claim.	  Roughly	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  ago,	  Mary	  Ann	  Glen-­‐don	  concluded,	  based	  on	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  abortion	  politics,	  that	  Roe	  v.	  Wade,	  by	  framing	  abortion	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   individual	  rights,	  had	  delayed	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  abortion	  issue	  in	  the	  United	  States.63	  I	  wish	  there	  were	  more	  truly	  comparative	  studies	  that	  followed	  in	  Glendon’s	  footsteps.	  Even	   if	   one	  wishes	   to	   stick	   to	   the	   United	   States,	   comparisons	   are	   available.	  Although	   the	   United	   States	   is	   prone	   to	   “adversarial	   legalism,”64	   not	   all	   areas	   of	  American	  public	  policy	  have	  become	  judicialized,	  and	  we	  might	  compare	  fields	  like	  abortion	  and	  gay	  rights	  to	  those	  in	  which	  courts	  have	  declined	  to	  take	  the	  leading	  
                                                            	   59.	  	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  114.	  	   60.	  	   For	  example,	  see	  JEB	  BARNES,	  DUST	  UP:	  ASBESTOS	  LITIGATION	  AND	  THE	  FAILURE	  OF	  COMMON	  SENSE	  POLICY	  REFORM	   (2011);	   CHARLES	   R.	   EPP,	   MAKING	   RIGHTS	   REAL:	   ACTIVISTS,	   BUREAUCRATS,	   AND	   THE	   CREATION	   OF	   THE	  LEGALISTIC	  STATE	  (2010);	  GORDON	  SILVERSTEIN,	  LAW’S	  ALLURE:	  HOW	  LAW	  SHAPES,	  CONSTRAINS,	  SAVES,	  AND	  KILLS	  POLITICS	   (2009);	   MICHAEL	   W.	   MCCANN,	   RIGHTS	   AT	   WORK:	   PAY	   EQUITY	   REFORM	   AND	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   LEGAL	  MOBILIZATION	   (2006);	   R.	   SHEP	   MELNICK,	   BETWEEN	   THE	   LINES:	   INTERPRETING	   WELFARE	   RIGHTS	   (1994);	  ROSENBERG,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   61.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  167.	  	   62.	  	   David	   Rayside,	  The	  United	   States	   in	   Comparative	   Context,	   in	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   SAME-­‐SEX	  MARRIAGE	  341,	  356	  (Craig	  A.	  Rimmerman	  &	  Clyde	  Wilcox	  eds.,	  2007).	  	  	   63.	  	   MARY	  ANN	  GLENDON,	  ABORTION	  AND	  DIVORCE	  IN	  WESTERN	  LAW	  (1989).	  	  	   64.	  	   ROBERT	  A.	  KAGAN,	  ADVERSARIAL	  LEGALISM:	  THE	  AMERICAN	  WAY	  OF	  LAW	  (2001)	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role.	  The	  Supreme	  Court,	  for	  example,	  opted	  not	  to	  recognize	  a	  “right	  to	  die”	  in	  the	  Constitution,	  and	  that	  has	  left	  the	  issue	  to	  state	  legislatures	  and	  courts	  to	  play	  out.65	  How	  has	  the	  whole	   issue	  of	  compassionate	  care	  for	  people	  with	  terminal	   illnesses	  developed	  in	  the	  wake	  of	   the	  Court’s	  retreat?	  Has	  the	  movement	   for	  a	  right	  to	  die	  provoked	  much	   countermobilization	   and	   backlash?	   Has	   nonjudicial	   policymaking	  addressed	  the	  underlying	  issues	  satisfactorily?	  Rather	  than	  weighing	  counterfactu-­‐als,	  Klarman’s	  technique,	  we	  might	  try	  to	  compare	  instead	  real	  outcomes,	  albeit	   in	  other	  policy	  areas.	  The	   most	   outstanding	   fact	   about	   the	   campaign	   for	   same-­‐sex	   marriage,	   and	  movement	   for	  gay	  and	   lesbian	   rights	  more	  generally,	   is	  how	  quickly	   it	  went	   from	  improbable	   to	   inevitable.	  Klarman,	  who	   finished	  his	  book	   in	  2012,	   labels	  his	   con-­‐cluding	   chapter	   the	   “inevitability	   of	   gay	  marriage”	   and	   largely	   predicts	   what	   has	  happened	   in	   the	  year	  since—the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  striking	  down	  of	  part	  of	  DOMA,	  and	  President	  Obama’s	  endorsement	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.66	  But	  Klarman	  doesn’t	  anticipate	   the	   speed	  of	   the	   change;	   he	   guesses	   that	  Obama	  will	   endorse	  marriage	  after	   the	  2012	   election,	   presumably	   to	   forestall	   a	   backlash,67	  when	   in	   fact	  Obama	  made	  his	  announcement	  six	  months	  before,	  to	  widespread	  applause—and	  without	  much	  pushback	  from	  Republicans,	  who	  seemed	  determined	  to	  move	  on	  to	  other	  is-­‐sues.68	  The	  speed	  with	  which	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  cause	  has	  advanced	  makes	  the	  story	   Klarman	   tells	   dramatic,	   but	   also	   undermines	   its	   usefulness	   for	   probing	   the	  ways	  in	  which	  litigation	  advances	  or	  retards	  social	  change	  movements.	  I	  can	  imag-­‐ine	  scenarios	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  turned	  away	  from	  the	  death	  penalty	  in	  the	  absence	   of	   Furman	   v.	   Georgia,69	   and	   I	   can	   imagine	   how	   the	   abortion	   issue	  might	  have	  been	  better	  settled	  if	  not	  for	  Roe	  v.	  Wade.70	  It	  is	  harder	  for	  me	  to	  imagine	  the	  scenario	  Klarman	  invokes,	   in	  which	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  movement	  was	  sig-­‐nificantly	  more	  successful	  or	  swift	   in	  reaching	  its	  goals.	  I	  suspect	  that	  as	  the	  years	  go	  by,	   the	  backlashes	  on	  which	  Klarman	  focuses	  his	  attention	  will	  seem	  more	  and	  more	  like	  muddy	  patches	  on	  a	  very	  fast	  road.	  
                                                            	   65.	  	   See	  Washington	  v.	  Glucksberg,	  521	  U.S.	  709	  (1997),	  and	  Vacco	  v.	  Quill,	  521	  U.S.	  793	  (1997).	  	   66.	  	   KLARMAN,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  193.	  	   67.	  	   Id.	  at	  196.	  	   68.	  	   Jackie	  Calmes	  &	  Peter	  Baker,	  Obama	  Says	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  Should	  be	  Legal,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  May	  9,	  2012,	   http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-­‐says-­‐same-­‐sex-­‐marriage-­‐should-­‐be-­‐legal.html.	  	   69.	  	   Furman	  v.	  Georgia,	  408	  U.S.	  238	  (1972).	  	   70.	  	   Roe	  v.	  Wade,	  410	  U.S.	  113	  (1973).	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